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We lay out a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model, and show how the
equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inﬂation and the output gap.
We use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rule-
based policy regimes for the small open economy: domestic inﬂation and CPI-based Taylor rules, and
an exchange rate peg. We show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount
of exchange rate volatility that they entail. We also discuss a special case for which domestic inﬂation
targeting constitutes the optimal policy, and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of
the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the
suboptimal rules.
1. INTRODUCTION
Much recent work in macroeconomics has involved the development and evaluation of monetary
models that bring imperfect competition and nominal rigidities into the dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium structure that for a long time had been the hallmark of real business
cycle (RBC) theory. In the resulting models—often referred to as New Keynesian—changes
in monetary settings generally have non-trivial effects on real variables. Monetary policy may
thus become a potential stabilization tool, as well as an independent source of economic
ﬂuctuations. Not surprisingly, the study of the properties of alternative monetary policy rules (i.e.
speciﬁcations of how the central bank changes the settings of its policy instrument in response to
changes in macroeconomic conditions) has been a fruitful area of research in recent years and a
natural application of the new generation of models.1
In the present paper we lay out a small open economy version of a model with Calvo-
type staggered price-setting, and use it as a framework for analysing the properties and macro-
economic implications of alternative monetary policy regimes.2 The use of a staggered price-
setting structure allows for richer dynamic effects of monetary policy than those found in the
models with one-period advanced price-setting that are common in the recent open economy
literature.3 Most importantly, and in contrast with most of the existing literature—where mon-
etary policy is introduced by assuming that some monetary aggregate follows an exogenous
1. The volume edited by Taylor (1999) contains several signiﬁcant contributions to that literature. See, e.g.
Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) for a survey.
2. See, e.g. King and Wolman (1996), Yun (1996), and Woodford (2003, Chapter 4), for an analysis of the
canonical Calvo model in a closed economy.
3. See, e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1999), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Betts and Devereux (2000),
and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
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stochastic process—we model monetary policy as endogenous, with a short-term interest rate
being the instrument of that policy.4 For this very reason our framework allows us to model alter-
native monetary regimes. Furthermore, we believe that our approach accords much better with
the practice of modern central banks, and provides a more suitable framework for policy analysis
than the traditional one.
Our framework differs from much of the literature in that it models the small open economy
as one among a continuum of (inﬁnitesimally small) economies making up the world economy.
Our assumptions on preferences and technology, combined with the Calvo price-setting structure
and the assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets, give rise to a highly tractable framework and
to simple and intuitive log-linearized equilibrium conditions for the small open economy. In fact,
the latter can be reduced to a ﬁrst order, two-equation dynamical system for domestic inﬂation
and the output gap whose structure, consisting of a new Keynesian Phillips curve and a dynamic
IS-type equation, is identical to the one associated with the workhorse sticky price model of
a closed economy, often used in monetary policy analysis.5 Of course, as we show below, the
coefﬁcients in the open economy’s equilibrium conditions also depend on parameters that are
speciﬁc to the open economy (in our case, the degree of openness and the substitutability among
goods of different origin), while the driving forces also include world output ﬂuctuations (which
are taken as exogenous to the small open economy). As in its closed economy counterpart, the
two equations must be complemented with a description of how monetary policy is conducted,
in order to close the model.
We then address the issue of a welfare evaluation of alternative policy regimes. Under
a particular parameterization of household’s preferences we can derive a second order
approximationtotheconsumer’sutility,whichcanbeusedforpolicyevaluationpurposes.6 Inthe
particular case considered (which entails log utility and a unit elasticity of substitution between
bundles of goods produced in different countries), we show that the optimal policy requires that
the domestic price level is fully stabilized.
We employ our framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications and the relative
welfare ranking of three simple monetary policy rules for the small open economy. Two of the
simple rules considered are stylized Taylor-type rules. The ﬁrst has the domestic interest rate
respond systematically to domestic inﬂation (i.e. inﬂation of domestic goods prices), whereas the
second assumes that CPI inﬂation is the variable the domestic central bank reacts to. The third
rule we consider is one that pegs the effective nominal exchange rate.
We show that these regimes can be ranked in terms of their implied volatility for the
nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade. Hence, a policy of strict domestic inﬂation
targeting, which in our framework can achieve a simultaneous stabilization of the output gap and
domestic inﬂation, implies a substantially greater volatility in the nominal exchange rate and
4. See Lane (2001) for a survey of the new open economy macroeconomics literature. The introduction of price
staggering in an open economy model follows the lead of Kollmann (2001) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002),
though both papers specify monetary policy as exogenous, restricting their analysis to the effects of a monetary shock. A
recent exception is given by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999), who solve for the optimal money supply rule in the context of a
model with one-period sticky wages. A more similar methodological approach can be found in Svensson (2000), in which
optimal policy is derived from the minimization by the central bank of a quadratic loss function. His model, however,
differs from the standard optimizing sticky price model analysed here in that it assumes a predetermined output and
inﬂation (resulting from their dependence on lagged variables, with a somewhat arbitrary lag structure), and introduces
an ad hoc cost-push shock in the inﬂation equation (which creates a trade-off between the output gap and inﬂation).
Since we wrote and circulated the ﬁrst version of the present paper there have been many signiﬁcant contributions to the
literature on monetary policy regimes in open economies, including McCallum and Nelson (2000), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001, 2005), Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2001, 2002), Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001), Kollmann (2002), Parrado and
Velasco (2002), and Benigno and Benigno (2003), among others.
5. See, e.g. Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 4) among others.
6. Benigno and Benigno (2003) obtain a similar result in the context of a two-country model.GAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 709
terms of trade than the one achieved under the two Taylor rules and/or the exchange rate peg. The
excess smoothness in the nominal exchange rate implied by those simple rules (relative to the
optimal policy), combined with the assumed inertia in nominal prices, prevents relative prices
from adjusting sufﬁciently fast in response to changes in relative productivity shocks, causing
thus a signiﬁcant deviation from the ﬁrst best allocation. In particular, a CPI-based Taylor rule
is shown to deliver equilibrium dynamics that allow us to characterize it as a hybrid regime,
somewhere between a domestic inﬂation-based Taylor rule and an exchange rate peg.
The ranking based on the terms of trade volatility translates one-for-one into a welfare
ranking. Thus, and for a broad range of parameter conﬁgurations, a domestic inﬂation-based
Taylor rule is shown to dominate a CPI-based Taylor rule; the latter in turn dominates an
exchange rate peg. More generally, we show that, across regimes, the higher the implied
equilibrium terms of trade volatility, the lower the volatility of inﬂation and output gap, and
therefore the higher the resulting welfare score.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic model.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium in log-linearized form, and its canonical representation in terms
of output gap and inﬂation. Section 4 analyses the macroeconomic implications of alternative
monetary policy regimes. Section 5 analyses optimal monetary policy in both the world and the
smalleconomyunderaparticularparameterizationinthelatter,andconductsawelfareevaluation
of the alternative monetary policy regimes. Section 6 concludes.
2. A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY MODEL
We model the world economy as a continuum of small open economies represented by the unit
interval. Since each economy is of measure zero, its domestic policy decisions do not have any
impact on the rest of the world. While different economies are subject to imperfectly correlated
productivity shocks, we assume that they share identical preferences, technology, and market
structure.
Next we describe in detail the problem facing households and ﬁrms located in one such
economy. Before we do so, a brief remark on notation is in order. Since our focus is on the
behaviour of a single economy and its interaction with the world economy, and in order to lighten
the notation, we will use variables without an i-index to refer to the small open economy being
modelled. Variables with an i ∈ [0,1] subscript refer to economy i, one among the continuum of
economies making up the world economy. Finally, variables with a star superscript correspond
to the world economy as a whole.
2.1. Households
A typical small open economy is inhabited by a representative household who seeks to
maximize
E0
X∞
t=0 βt U(Ct, Nt) (1)
where Nt denotes hours of labour, and Ct is a composite consumption index deﬁned by
Ct ≡

(1 − α)
1
η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
 η
η−1
(2)
where CH,t is an index of consumption of domestic goods given by the CES function
CH,t ≡
 Z 1
0
CH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
! ε
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where j ∈ [0,1] denotes the good variety.7 CF,t is an index of imported goods given by
CF,t ≡
 Z 1
0
(Ci,t)
γ−1
γ di
! γ
γ−1
where Ci,t is, in turn, an index of the quantity of goods imported from country i and consumed
by domestic households. It is given by an analogous CES function:
Ci,t ≡
 Z 1
0
Ci,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
! ε
ε−1
.
Notice that parameter ε > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties
(produced within any given country).8 Parameter α ∈ [0,1] is (inversely) related to the degree
of home bias in preferences, and is thus a natural index of openness. Parameter η > 0 measures
the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, from the viewpoint of the domestic
consumer, while γ measures the substitutability between goods produced in different foreign
countries.
The maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form
Z 1
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj +
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Pi,t(j)Ci,t(j)djdi + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt +WtNt +Tt (3)
for t = 0,1,2,..., where Pi,t(j) is the price of variety j imported from country i (expressed in
domestic currency, i.e. the currency of the importing country whose economy is being modelled).
Dt+1 is the nominal pay-off in period t +1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t (and which
includes shares in ﬁrms), Wt is the nominal wage, and Tt denotes lump-sum transfers/taxes.
All the previous variables are expressed in units of domestic currency. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor for one-period ahead nominal pay-offs relevant to the domestic household. We
assume that households have access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded internationally.
Notice that money does not appear in either the budget constraint or the utility function:
throughout we specify monetary policy in terms of an interest rate rule (directly or indirectly);
hence, we do not need to introduce money explicitly in the model.9
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each category of goods yields the
demand functions:
CH,t(j) =

PH,t(j)
PH,t
−ε
CH,t; Ci,t(j) =

Pi,t(j)
Pi,t
−ε
Ci,t (4)
for all i, j ∈ [0,1], where PH,t ≡
R 1
0 PH,t(j)1−εdj
 1
1−ε is the domestic price index (i.e. an
index of prices of domestically produced goods) and Pi,t ≡
R 1
0 Pi,t(j)1−εdj
 1
1−ε is a price
index for goods imported from country i (expressed in domestic currency), for all i ∈ [0,1]. It
follows from (4) that
R 1
0 PH,t(j) CH,t(j)dj = PH,t CH,t and
R 1
0 Pi,t(j) Ci,t(j)dj = Pi,t Ci,t.
7. As discussed below, each country produces a continuum of differentiated goods, represented by the unit
interval.
8. Notice that it is irrelevant whether we think of integrals like the one in (2) as including or not the corresponding
variable for the small economy being modelled, since its presence would have a negligible inﬂuence on the integral itself
(in fact each individual economy has a zero measure). The previous remark also applies to many other expressions
involving integrals over the continuum of economies (i.e. over i) that the reader will encounter below.
9. That modelling strategy has been adopted in much recent research on monetary policy. In it money can be
thought of as playing the role of a unit of account only.GAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 711
Furthermore, the optimal allocation of expenditures on imported goods by country of origin
implies
Ci,t =

Pi,t
PF,t
−γ
CF,t (5)
for all i ∈ [0,1], and where PF,t ≡
R 1
0 Pi,t
1−γdi
 1
1−γ is the price index for imported goods,
also expressed in domestic currency. Notice that (5) implies that we can write total expenditures
on imported goods as
R 1
0 Pi,t Ci,tdi = PF,t CF,t.
Finally, the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods is
given by
CH,t = (1 − α)

PH,t
Pt
−η
Ct; CF,t = α

PF,t
Pt
−η
Ct (6)
where Pt ≡

(1 − α) (PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η 1
1−η is the consumer price index (CPI).10
Notice that, when the price indexes for domestic and foreign goods are equal (as in the
steady state described below), parameter α corresponds to the share of domestic consumption
allocated to imported goods. It is also in this sense that α represents a natural index of
openness.
Accordingly, total consumption expenditures by domestic households are given by
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t = PtCt. Thus, the period budget constraint can be rewritten as
Pt Ct + Et{Qt,t+1 Dt+1} ≤ Dt + WtNt + Tt. (7)
In what follows we specialize the period utility function to take the form
U(C, N) ≡
C1−σ
1 − σ
−
N1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
.
Then we can rewrite the remaining optimality conditions for the household’s problem as follows:
Cσ
t N
ϕ
t =
Wt
Pt
(8)
which is a standard intratemporal optimality condition, and
β

Ct+1
Ct
−σ 
Pt
Pt+1

= Qt,t+1. (9)
Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (9) and rearranging terms we obtain a
conventional stochastic Euler equation:
βRt Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
−σ 
Pt
Pt+1
)
= 1 (10)
where Rt = 1
Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one-period discount bond paying off one
unit of domestic currency in t + 1 (with Et

Qt,t+1
	
being its price).
For future reference it is useful to note that (8) and (10) can be respectively written in log-
linearized form as:
10. It is useful to note, for future reference, that in the particular case of η = 1, the CPI takes the form
Pt = (PH,t)1−α(PF,t)α, while the consumption index is given by Ct = 1
(1−α)(1−α)αα CH,t
1−αCF,t
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wt − pt = σ ct + ϕ nt
ct = Et{ct+1} −
1
σ
(rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ) (11)
where lower case letters denote the logs of the respective variables, ρ ≡ β−1 − 1 is the time
discount rate, and πt ≡ pt − pt−1 is CPI inﬂation (with pt ≡ log Pt).
2.1.1. Domestic inﬂation, CPI inﬂation, the real exchange rate, and the terms of
trade: some identities. Before proceeding with our analysis of the equilibrium we introduce
several assumptions and deﬁnitions, and derive a number of identities that are extensively used
below.
We start by deﬁning the bilateral terms of trade between the domestic economy and country
i as Si,t =
Pi,t
PH,t , i.e. the price of country i’s goods in terms of home goods. The effective terms
of trade are thus given by
St ≡
PF,t
PH,t
=
 Z 1
0
S
1−γ
i,t di
! 1
1−γ
which can be approximated (up to ﬁrst order) by the log-linear expression
st =
Z 1
0
si,tdi. (12)
Log-linearization of the CPI formula around a symmetric steady state satisfying the
purchasing power parity (PPP) condition PH,t = PF,t yields11
pt ≡ (1 − α) pH,t + α pF,t
= pH,t + α st (13)
where st ≡ pF,t − pH,t denotes the (log) effective terms of trade, i.e. the price of foreign goods
in terms of home goods. It is useful to note, for future reference, that (12) and (13) hold exactly
when γ = 1 and η = 1, respectively.
It follows that domestic inﬂation—deﬁned as the rate of change in the index of domestic
goods prices, i.e. πH,t ≡ pH,t − pH,t−1—and CPI inﬂation are linked according to
πt = πH,t + α 1st (14)
which makes the gap between our two measures of inﬂation proportional to the per cent
change in the terms of trade, with the coefﬁcient of proportionality given by the index of
openness α.
We assume that the law of one price holds for individual goods at all times (both for
import and export prices), implying that Pi,t(j) = Ei,t Pi
i,t(j) for all i, j ∈ [0,1], where Ei,t
is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (the price of country i’s currency in terms of the domestic
currency), and Pi
i,t(j) is the price of country i’s good j expressed in the producer’s (i.e. country
i’s) currency. Plugging the previous assumption into the deﬁnition of Pi,t one obtains Pi,t =
Ei,t Pi
i,t, where Pi
i,t ≡
R 1
0 Pi
i,t(j)1−εdj
 1
1−ε. In turn, by substituting into the deﬁnition of PF,t
11. Below we discuss the conditions under which PPP holds in our model.GAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 713
and log-linearizing around the symmetric steady state we obtain
pF,t =
Z 1
0
(ei,t + pi
i,t)di
= et + p∗
t
where et ≡
R 1
0 ei,tdi is the (log) nominal effective exchange rate, pi
i,t ≡
R 1
0 pi
i,t(j)dj is the (log)
domestic price index for country i (expressed in terms of its currency), and p∗
t ≡
R 1
0 pi
i,tdi is the
(log) world price index. Notice that for the world as a whole there is no distinction between CPI
and domestic price level, nor for their corresponding inﬂation rates.
Combining the previous result with the deﬁnition of the terms of trade we obtain the
following expression:
st = et + p∗
t − pH,t. (15)
Next, we derive a relationship between the terms of trade and the real exchange rate. First,
we deﬁne the bilateral real exchange rate with country i as Qi,t ≡
Ei,t Pi
t
Pt , i.e. the ratio of the two
countries’ CPIs, both expressed in domestic currency. Let qt ≡
R 1
0 qi,tdi be the (log) effective
real exchange rate, where qi,t ≡ logQi,t. It follows that
qt =
Z 1
0
(ei,t + pi
t − pt)di
= et + p∗
t − pt
= st + pH,t − pt
= (1 − α) st
where the last equality holds only up to a ﬁrst order approximation when η 6= 1.12
2.1.2. International risk sharing. Under the assumption of complete securities markets,
a ﬁrst order condition analogous to (9) must also hold for the representative household in any
other country, say country i:
β
 
Ci
t+1
Ci
t
!−σ  
Pi
t
Pi
t+1
! 
Ei
t
Ei
t+1
!
= Qt,t+1. (16)
Combining (9) and (16), together with the real exchange rate deﬁnition, it follows that
Ct = ϑiCi
t Qi,t
1
σ (17)
for all t, and where ϑi is a constant which will generally depend on initial conditions regarding
relative net asset positions. Henceforth, and without loss of generality, we assume symmetric
initial conditions (i.e. zero net foreign asset holdings and an ex ante identical environment), in
which case we have ϑi = ϑ = 1 for all i. As shown in Appendix A, in the symmetric perfect
foresight steady state we also have that C = Ci = C∗ and Qi = Si = 1 (i.e. purchasing power
parity holds), for all i.
12. The last equality can be derived by log-linearizing Pt
PH,t =
h
(1 − α) + α S
1−η
t
i 1
1−η around a symmetric
steady state, which yields
pt − pH,t = α st.714 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Taking logs on both sides of (17) and integrating over i we obtain
ct = c∗
t +
1
σ
qt (18)
= c∗
t +

1 − α
σ

st
where c∗
t ≡
R 1
0 ci
tdi is our index for world consumption (in log terms), and where the second
equality holds only up to a ﬁrst order approximation when η 6= 1. Thus we see that the
assumption of complete markets at the international level leads to a simple relationship linking
domestic consumption with world consumption and the terms of trade.13
2.1.3. Uncovered interest parity and the terms of trade. Under the assumption
of complete international ﬁnancial markets, the equilibrium price (in terms of domestic
currency) of a riskless bond denominated in foreign currency is given by Ei,t (Ri
t)−1 =
Et{Qt,t+1 Ei,t+1}. The previous pricing equation can be combined with the domestic bond
pricing equation, (Rt)−1 = Et{Qt,t+1} to obtain a version of the uncovered interest parity
condition:
Et{Qt,t+1 [Rt − Ri
t (Ei,t+1/Ei,t)]} = 0.
Log-linearizing around a perfect foresight steady state, and aggregating over i, yields the
familiar expression14
rt − r∗
t = Et{1et+1}. (19)
Combining the deﬁnition of the (log) terms of trade with (19) yields the following stochastic
difference equation:
st = (r∗
t − Et{π∗
t+1}) − (rt − Et{πH,t+1}) + Et{st+1}. (20)
As we show in Appendix A, the terms of trade are pinned down uniquely in the perfect
foresight steady state. That fact, combined with our assumption of stationarity in the model’s
driving forces and a convenient normalization (requiring that PPP holds in the steady state),
implies that limT→∞ Et{sT} = 0.15 Hence, we can solve (20) forward to obtain
st = Et
nX∞
k=0 [(r∗
t+k − π∗
t+k+1) − (rt+k − πH,t+k+1)]
o
(21)
i.e. the terms of trade are a function of current and anticipated real interest rate differentials.
We must point out that while equation (20) (and (21)) provides a convenient (and intuitive)
way of representing the connection between terms of trade and interest rate differentials, it does
not constitute an additional independent equilibrium condition. In particular, it is easy to check
that (20) can be derived by combining the consumption Euler equations for both the domestic
and world economies with the risk sharing condition (18) and equation (14).
Next we turn our attention to the supply side of the economy.
13. A similar relationship holds in many international RBC models. See, e.g. Backus and Smith (1993).
14. This abstracts from the presence of a risk premium term. See Kollmann (2002) for a speciﬁcation which
includes an exogenous stochastic risk premium.
15. Our assumption of PPP holding in the steady state implies that the real interest rate differential will revert to
a zero mean. More generally, the real interest rate differential will revert to a constant mean, as long as the terms of
trade are stationary in ﬁrst differences. That would be the case if, say, the technology parameter had a unit root or a
different average rate of growth relative to the rest of the world. In those cases we could have persistent real interest rate
differentials.GAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 715
2.2. Firms
2.2.1. Technology. A typical ﬁrm in the home economy produces a differentiated good
with a linear technology represented by the production function
Yt(j) = At Nt(j)
where at ≡ log At follows the AR(1) process at = ρa at−1 +εt, and j ∈ [0,1] is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
index. Hence, the real marginal cost (expressed in terms of domestic prices) will be common
across domestic ﬁrms and given by
mct = −ν + wt − pH,t − at
where ν ≡ −log(1 − τ), with τ being an employment subsidy whose role is discussed later in
more detail.
Let Yt ≡
hR 1
0 Yt(j)1−1
εdj
i ε
ε−1 represent an index for aggregate domestic output, analogous
to the one introduced for consumption. It is useful, for future reference, to derive an approximate
aggregate production function relating the previous index to aggregate employment. Hence,
notice that
Nt ≡
Z 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
Yt Zt
At
where Zt ≡
R 1
0
Yt(j)
Yt dj. In Appendix C we show that equilibrium variations in zt ≡ log Zt
around the perfect foresight steady state are of second order. Thus, and up to a ﬁrst order
approximation, we have an aggregate relationship
yt = at + nt. (22)
2.2.2. Price-setting. We assume that ﬁrms set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo
(1983). Hence, a measure 1−θ of (randomly selected) ﬁrms sets new prices each period, with an
individual ﬁrm’s probability of re-optimizing in any given period being independent of the time
elapsed since it last reset its price. As we show in Appendix B, the optimal price-setting strategy
for the typical ﬁrm resetting its price in period t can be approximated by the (log-linear) rule
pH,t = µ + (1 − βθ)
X∞
k=0 (βθ)k Et{mct+k + pH,t} (23)
where pH,t denotes the (log) of newly set domestic prices, and µ ≡ log
  ε
ε−1

, which
corresponds to the log of the (gross) mark-up in the steady state (or, equivalently, the optimal
mark-up in a ﬂexible price economy).
Hence, we see that the pricing decision in our model (as in its closed economy counterpart)
is a forward-looking one. The reason is simple and well understood by now: ﬁrms that are adjust-
ing prices in any given period recognize that the price they set will remain effective for a (ran-
dom) number of periods. As a result they set the price as a mark-up over a weighted average of
expected future marginal costs, instead of looking at current marginal cost only. Notice that in the
ﬂexible price limit (i.e. as θ → 0), we recover the familiar mark-up rule pH,t = µ+mct + pH,t.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
3.1. Aggregate demand and output determination
3.1.1. Consumption and output in the small open economy. Goods market clearing in
the representative small open economy (“home”) requires716 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) +
Z 1
0
Ci
H,t(j)di (24)
=

PH,t(j)
PH,t
−ε "
(1 − α)

PH,t
Pt
−η
Ct + α
Z 1
0
 
PH,t
Ei,t Pi
F,t
!−γ  
Pi
F,t
Pi
t
!−η
Ci
tdi
#
for all j ∈ [0,1] and all t, where Ci
H,t(j) denotes country i’s demand for good j produced
in the home economy. Notice that the second equality has made use of (6) and (5) together
with our assumption of symmetric preferences across countries, which implies Ci
H,t(j) =
α

PH,t(j)
PH,t
−ε 
PH,t
Ei,t Pi
F,t
−γ 
Pi
F,t
Pi
t
−η
Ci
t.
Plugging (24) into the deﬁnition of aggregate domestic output Yt ≡
hR 1
0 Yt(j)1−1
εdj
i ε
ε−1,
we obtain
Yt = (1 − α)

PH,t
Pt
−η
Ct + α
Z 1
0
 
PH,t
Ei,t Pi
F,t
!−γ  
Pi
F,t
Pi
t
!−η
Ci
tdi
=

PH,t
Pt
−η "
(1 − α) Ct + α
Z 1
0
 
Ei,t Pi
F,t
PH,t
!γ−η
Q
η
i,tCi
tdi
#
=

PH,t
Pt
−η
Ct
"
(1 − α) + α
Z 1
0

Si
tSi,t
γ−η
Q
η− 1
σ
i,t di
#
(25)
where the last equality follows from (17), and where Si
t denotes the effective terms of trade of
country i, while Si,t denotes the bilateral terms of trade between the home economy and foreign
country i. Notice that in the particular case of σ = η = γ = 1 the previous condition can be
written exactly as16
Yt = Ct Sα
t . (26)
More generally, and recalling that
R 1
0 si
tdi = 0, we can derive the following ﬁrst order
log-linear approximation to (25) around the symmetric steady state:
yt = ct + αγ st + α

η −
1
σ

qt
= ct +
αω
σ
st (27)
where ω ≡ σγ + (1 − α)(ση − 1). Notice that σ = η = γ = 1 implies ω = 1.
A condition analogous to the one above will hold for all countries. Thus, for a generic
country i it can be rewritten as yi
t = ci
t + αω
σ si
t. By aggregating over all countries we can derive
a world market clearing condition as follows:
y∗
t ≡
Z 1
0
yi
tdi (28)
=
Z 1
0
ci
tdi ≡ c∗
t
16. Here one must use the fact that under the assumption η = 1, the CPI takes the form Pt = (PH,t)1−α(PF,t)α
thus implying Pt
PH,t =
 PF,t
PH,t
α
= Sα
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where y∗
t and c∗
t are indexes for world output and consumption (in log terms), and where the
main equality follows, once again, from the fact that
R 1
0 si
tdi = 0.
Combining (27) with (17) and (28), we obtain
yt = y∗
t +
1
σα
st (29)
where σα ≡ σ
(1−α)+αω > 0.
Finally, combining (27) with Euler equation (11), we get
yt = Et{yt+1} −
1
σ
(rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ) −
αω
σ
Et{1st+1} (30)
= Et{yt+1} −
1
σ
(rt − Et{πH,t+1} − ρ) −
α2
σ
Et{1st+1}
= Et{yt+1} −
1
σα
(rt − Et{πH,t+1} − ρ) + α2Et{1y∗
t+1}
where 2 ≡ (σγ − 1) + (1 − α)(ση − 1) = ω − 1.
3.1.2. The trade balance. Let nxt ≡

1
Y

Yt − Pt
PH,t Ct

denote net exports in terms
of domestic output, expressed as a fraction of steady state output Y. In the particular case of
σ = η = γ = 1, it follows from (25) that PH,tYt = PtCt for all t, thus implying a balanced
trade at all times. More generally, a ﬁrst order approximation yields nxt = yt − ct − α st which
combined with (27) implies
nxt = α
ω
σ
− 1

st. (31)
Again, in the special case of σ = η = γ = 1 we have nxt = 0 for all t, though the latter
property will also hold for any conﬁguration of those parameters satisfying σ(γ − 1) + (1 −
α)(ση − 1) = 0. More generally, the sign of the relationship between the terms of trade and net
exports is ambiguous, depending on the relative size of σ, γ, and η.17
3.2. The supply side: marginal cost and inﬂation dynamics
3.2.1. Marginal cost and inﬂation dynamics in the small open economy. In the small
open economy, the dynamics of domestic inﬂation in terms of real marginal cost are described
by an equation analogous to the one associated with a closed economy. Hence,
πH,t = β Et{πH,t+1} + λ c mct (32)
where λ ≡
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ . Details of the derivation can be found in Appendix B.
The determination of the real marginal cost as a function of domestic output in the small
open economy differs somewhat from that in the closed economy, due to the existence of a
wedge between output and consumption, and between domestic and consumer prices. Thus, in
our model we have
17. The fact that in our economy movements in the trade balance are allowed is a key difference with respect to
many models in the literature (see, e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001), which typically require log utility (σ = 1) and unitary
elasticity of substitution (η = 1) for balanced trade to hold continuously. Notice also that our framework requires stricter
conditions for balanced trade, in that it also requires γ = 1 (or any combination of η and γ such that ω
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mct = −ν + (wt − pH,t) − at
= −ν + (wt − pt) + (pt − pH,t) − at
= −ν + σ ct + ϕ nt + α st − at
= −ν + σ y∗
t + ϕ yt + st − (1 + ϕ) at (33)
where the last equality makes use of (22) and (18). Thus, we see that marginal cost is increasing
in the terms of trade and world output. Both variables end up inﬂuencing the real wage, through
the wealth effect on labour supply resulting from their impact on domestic consumption. In
addition, changes in the terms of trade have a direct effect on the product wage, for any given
real wage. The inﬂuence of technology (through its direct effect on labour productivity) and of
domestic output (through its effect on employment and, hence, the real wage—for given output)
is analogous to that observed in the closed economy.
Finally, using (29) to substitute for st, we can rewrite the previous expression for the real
marginal cost in terms of domestic output and productivity, as well as world output:
mct = −ν + (σα + ϕ) yt + (σ − σα) y∗
t − (1 + ϕ) at. (34)
Notice that in the special cases α = 0 and/or σ = η = γ = 1, which imply σ = σα, the
domestic real marginal cost is completely insulated from movements in foreign output.
3.3. Equilibrium dynamics: a canonical representation
In this section we show that the linearized equilibrium dynamics for the small open economy
have a representation in terms of output gap and domestic inﬂation analogous to that of its
closed economy counterpart. That representation, which we refer to as the canonical one, has
provided the basis for the analysis and evaluation of alternative policy rules in much of the recent
literature. Let us deﬁne the domestic output gap xt as the deviation of (log) domestic output yt
from its natural level yt, where the latter is in turn deﬁned as the equilibrium level of output in
the absence of nominal rigidities (and conditional on world output y∗
t ). Formally,
xt ≡ yt − yt.
The domestic natural level of output can be found after imposing mct = −µ for all t and
solving for domestic output in equation (34):
yt =  + 0 at + α9 y∗
t (35)
where  ≡
v−µ
σα+ϕ, 0 ≡
1+ϕ
σα+ϕ > 0, and 9 ≡ − 2 σα
σα+ϕ.
It also follows from (34) that the domestic real marginal cost and output gap will be related
according to
c mct = (σα + ϕ) xt
which we can combine with (32) to derive a version of the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)
for the small open economy in terms of the output gap:
πH,t = β Et{πH,t+1} + κα xt (36)
where κα ≡ λ(σα + ϕ). Notice that for α = 0 (or σ = η = γ = 1) the slope coefﬁcient is given
by λ(σ + ϕ) as in the standard, closed economy NKPC. More generally, we see that the form of
the Phillips equation for the open economy corresponds to that of the closed economy, at least
as far as domestic (i.e. producer) inﬂation is concerned. The degree of openness α affects the
dynamics of inﬂation only through its inﬂuence on the size of the slope of the Phillips curve, i.e.
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a change in domestic output has an effect on marginal cost through its impact on employment
(captured by ϕ), and the terms of trade (captured by σα, which is a function of the degree of
openness and the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods). In particular, under the
assumption that ση > 1, an increase in openness lowers the size of the adjustment in the terms of
trade necessary to absorb a change in domestic output (relative to world output), thus dampening
the impact of that adjustment on marginal cost and inﬂation.
Using (30) it is straightforward to derive a version of the so-called dynamic IS equation for
the open economy in terms of the output gap:
xt = Et{xt+1} −
1
σα
(rt − Et{πH,t+1} − rrt) (37)
where
rrt ≡ ρ − σα0(1 − ρa) at + ασα(2 + 9) Et{1y∗
t+1}
is the small open economy’s natural rate of interest.
Thus we see that the small open economy’s equilibrium is characterized by a forward-
looking IS-type equation similar to that found in the closed economy. Two differences can be
pointed out, however. First, the degree of openness inﬂuences the sensitivity of the output gap
to interest rate changes. In particular, if ω > 1 (which obtains for “high” values of η and γ), an
increase in openness raises that sensitivity (through the stronger effects of the induced terms of
trade changes on demand). Second, openness generally makes the natural interest rate depend on
expected world output growth, in addition to domestic productivity.
4. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY: A SPECIAL CASE
In this section we derive and characterize the optimal monetary policy for our small open
economy, as well as its implications for a number of macroeconomic variables. Our analysis
is restricted to a special case for which a second order approximation to the welfare of the
representative consumer can be easily derived analytically.
Let us take as a benchmark the well-known closed economy version of the Calvo economy
with staggered price-setting. As discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), under the
assumption of a constant employment subsidy τ that neutralizes the distortion associated with
ﬁrms’ market power, it can be shown that the optimal monetary policy is the one that replicates
the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation. That policy requires that real marginal costs (and thus
mark-ups) are stabilized at their steady state level, which in turn implies that domestic prices be
fully stabilized. The intuition for that result is straightforward: with the subsidy in place, there is
only one effective distortion left in the economy, namely, sticky prices. By stabilizing mark-ups
at their “frictionless” level, nominal rigidities cease to be binding, since ﬁrms do not feel any
desire to adjust prices. By construction, the resulting equilibrium allocation is efﬁcient, and the
price level remains constant.18
In an open economy—and as noted, among others, by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)—there is
an additional factor that distorts the incentives of the monetary authority (beyond the presence of
market power): the possibility of inﬂuencing the terms of trade in a way beneﬁcial to domestic
consumers. This possibility is a consequence of the imperfect substitutability between domestic
and foreign goods, combined with sticky prices (which render monetary policy non-neutral).19
As shown below, and similarly to Benigno and Benigno (2003) in the context of a two-country
18. See Gal´ ı (2003) for a discussion.
19. This distinguishes our analysis from that of Goodfriend and King (2001) who assume that the price of domestic
goods is determined in the world market.720 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
model, the introduction of an employment subsidy that exactly offsets the market power distor-
tion is not sufﬁcient to render the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation optimal, for, at the margin,
the monetary authority would have an incentive to deviate from it to improve the terms of trade.
For the special parameter conﬁguration σ = η = γ = 1 we can derive analytically the
employment subsidy that exactly offsets the combined effects of market power and the terms of
trade distortions, thus rendering the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation optimal.20 That result,
in turn, rules out the possibility of the existence of an average inﬂation (or deﬂation) bias, and
allows us to focus on policies consistent with zero average inﬂation, in a way analogous to the
analysis for the closed economy found in the literature.
Let us ﬁrst characterize the optimal allocation from the viewpoint of a social planner
facing the same resource constraints to which the small open economy is subject in equilibrium
(vis-` a-vis the rest of the world), given our assumption of complete markets. In that case,
the optimal allocation must maximize U(Ct, Nt) subject to (i) the technological constraint
Yt = AtNt, (ii) a consumption/output possibilities set implicit in the international risk sharing
conditions (17), and (iii) the market clearing condition (25).
The derivation of a tractable, analytical solution requires that we restrict ourselves to the
special case of σ = η = γ = 1. In that case, (18) and (26) imply the exact expression
Ct = Y1−α
t (Y∗
t )α. The optimal allocation (from the viewpoint of the small open economy, which
takes world output and consumption as given), must satisfy
−
UN(Ct, Nt)
UC(Ct, Nt)
= (1 − α)
Ct
Nt
which, under the assumed preferences, implies a constant employment N = (1 − α)
1
1+ϕ.
Notice, on the other hand, that the ﬂexible price equilibrium in the small open economy
(with corresponding variables denoted with an upper bar) satisﬁes
1 −
1
ε
= MCt
= −
(1 − τ)
At
S
α
t
UN(Ct, Nt)
UC(Ct, Nt)
=
(1 − τ)
At
Yt
Ct
N
ϕ
t Ct
= (1 − τ) N
1+ϕ
t .
Hence, by setting τ such that (1 − τ)(1 − α) = 1 − 1
ε is satisﬁed (or, equivalently,
ν = µ + log(1 − α)) we guarantee the optimality of the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation.
As in the closed economy case, the optimal monetary policy requires stabilizing the output gap
(i.e. xt = 0, for all t). Equation (36) then implies that domestic prices are also stabilized under
that optimal policy (πH,t = 0 for all t). Thus, in the special case under consideration, (strict)
domestic inﬂation targeting (DIT) is indeed the optimal policy.
4.1. Implementation and macroeconomic implications
In this section we discuss the implementation and characterize the equilibrium processes for a
number of variables of the small open economy, under the assumption of a domestic inﬂation
20. Condition σ = η = 1 corresponds to the one required in the two-country framework of Benigno and Benigno
(2003). Our model of a small open economy in a multicountry world requires, in addition, that the substitutability (in the
home consumer’s preferences) between goods produced in any two foreign countries is also unity (i.e. γ = 1).GAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 721
targeting policy (DIT). While we have shown that policy to be optimal only for the special case
considered above, in this subsection we look at the implications of that policy for the general
case.
4.1.1. Implementation. As discussed above full stabilization of domestic prices implies
xt = πH,t = 0
for all t. This in turn implies that yt = yt and rt = rrt will hold in equilibrium for all t, with all
the remaining variables matching their natural level all the time.
Interestingly, however, rt = rrt cannot be interpreted as a “rule” that the central bank could
follow mechanically in order to implement the optimal allocation. For, while xt = πH,t = 0
would certainly constitute an equilibrium in that case, the same equilibrium would not be
unique; instead, multiple equilibria and the possibility of stationary sunspot ﬂuctuations may
arise. The previous result should not be surprising given the equivalence shown above between
the dynamical system describing the equilibrium of the small open economy and that of the
closed economy, and given the ﬁndings in the related closed economy literature. In particular,
and as shown in Appendix C, we can invoke that literature to point to a simple solution to that
problem. In particular, the indeterminacy problem can be avoided, and the uniqueness of the
optimal equilibrium allocation restored, by having the central bank follow a rule which would
imply that the interest rate should respond to domestic inﬂation and/or the output gap were those
variables to deviate from their (zero) target values. More precisely, suppose that the central bank
commits itself to the rule
rt = rrt + φπ πH,t + φx xt. (38)
As shown by Bullard and Mitra (2002), if we restrict ourselves to non-negative values of φπ
and φx, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for uniqueness of the optimal allocation is given by
κα (φπ − 1) + (1 − β) φx > 0. (39)
Notice that, once uniqueness is restored, the term φπ πH,t + φx xt appended to the interest
rate rule vanishes, implying that rt = rrt for all t. Thus, we see that stabilization of the output
gap and inﬂation requires a credible threat by the central bank to vary the interest rate sufﬁciently
in response to any deviations of inﬂation and/or the output gap from the target; yet, the very
existence of that threat makes its effective application unnecessary.
4.1.2. Macroeconomic implications. Under strict domestic inﬂation targeting (DIT), the
behaviour of real variables in the small open economy corresponds to the one we would observe
in the absence of nominal frictions. Hence, we see from inspection of equation (35) that domestic
output always increases in response to a positive technology shock at home.
The sign of the response to a rise in world output is ambiguous, however, and it depends on
the sign of 2, as shown in (35). To obtain some intuition for the forces at work notice ﬁrst that
the natural level of the terms of trade is given by
st = σα(yt − y∗
t )
= σα + σα0 at − σα8 y∗
t
where 8 ≡
σ+ϕ
σα+ϕ > 0. Thus, an increase in world output always generates an improvement in the
terms of trade (i.e. a real appreciation). The resulting expenditure-switching effect, together with
the effect of the real appreciation on domestic consumption through the risk sharing transfer of
resources (see (17)), tends to reduce aggregate demand and domestic economic activity. For any
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effect (resulting from higher exports) as well as by a positive effect on domestic consumption
associated with international risk sharing (and given the implied higher world consumption). It
can be easily checked that the contractionary (expansionary) effect dominates whenever ω > 1
(ω < 1). In the special case considered above ω = 1, thus implying that a change in world output
leaves the terms of trade and domestic output unchanged under DIT policy.
Given that under DIT domestic prices are fully stabilized, it follows that et = st − p∗
t , i.e.
under the DIT regime the nominal exchange rate moves one-for-one with the (natural) terms of
trade and (inversely) with the world price level. In the limiting case of constant world prices,
the nominal exchange rate will inherit all the statistical properties of the (natural) terms of trade,
including its stationarity (and thus its reversion to a constant mean).21 Of course, stationarity
does not necessarily imply low volatility. In particular, in the case of constant world prices, the
volatility of the nominal exchange rate under DIT will be proportional to the volatility of the gap
between the natural level of domestic output (in turn related to productivity) and world output.
A high positive (negative) correlation between domestic productivity and world output will tend
to decrease (increase) the volatility of the nominal and real exchange rates.
In addition, we can also derive the implied equilibrium process for the level of the CPI.
Given the constancy of domestic prices it is given by
pt = α(et + p∗
t )
= α st.
Thus, we see that under domestic inﬂation targeting the CPI level will vary with the (natural)
terms of trade and will inherit its statistical properties. If the economy is very open, and if
domestic productivity (and hence the natural level of domestic output) is not much synchronized
with world output, CPI prices could potentially be highly volatile, even if the domestic price level
is constant.
4.2. The welfare costs of deviations from the optimal policy
Under the particular assumptions for which strict domestic inﬂation targeting has been shown
to be optimal (i.e. log utility and unit elasticity of substitution between goods of different
origin), it is possible to derive a second order approximation to the utility losses of the domestic
representative consumer resulting from deviations from the optimal policy. As we show in
Appendix D, those losses, expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption, can be written
as
W = −
(1 − α)
2
X∞
t=0 βt
hε
λ
π2
H,t + (1 + ϕ) x2
t
i
. (40)
Taking unconditional expectations on (40) and letting β → 1, the expected welfare losses
of any policy that deviated from strict inﬂation targeting can be written in terms of the variances
of inﬂation and the output gap:
V = −
(1 − α)
2
hε
λ
var(πH,t) + (1 + ϕ) var(xt)
i
. (41)
Below we make use of the previous approximation to assess the welfare implications of
alternative suboptimal monetary policy rules, and to rank those rules on welfare grounds.
21. The stationarity of the terms of trade is, in turn, an implication of the stationarity of the productivity differential
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5. SIMPLE MONETARY POLICY RULES FOR THE SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
In the present section we analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative monetary
policy regimes for the small open economy. Two of the simple rules considered are stylized
Taylor-type rules. The ﬁrst has the domestic interest rate respond systematically to domestic
inﬂation, whereas the second assumes that CPI inﬂation is the variable the domestic central
bank reacts to. The third rule we consider is one that pegs the effective nominal exchange rate.
Formally, the domestic inﬂation-based Taylor rule (DITR, for short) is speciﬁed as follows:
rt = ρ + φπ πH,t.
The CPI inﬂation-based Taylor rule (CITR, for short) is assumed to take the form
rt = ρ + φπ πt.
Finally, the exchange rate peg (PEG, for short) implies
et = 0
for all t.
Below we provide a comparison of the equilibrium properties of several macroeconomic
variables under the above simple rules for a calibrated version of our model economy. We
compare such properties to those associated with a strict domestic inﬂation targeting (DIT),
the policy that is optimal under the conditions discussed above, and which we assume to be
satisﬁed in our baseline calibration. We next brieﬂy describe the calibration strategy underlying
that exercise.
5.1. A numerical analysis of alternative rules
5.1.1. Calibration. In this section we present some quantitative results based on a
calibrated version of our model economy. Let us ﬁrst state the main assumptions underlying
our baseline calibration, which we take as a benchmark. We set σ = η = γ = 1, in a way
consistent with the special case considered above. We assume ϕ = 3, which implies a labour
supply elasticity of 1
3, and a value for the steady state mark-up µ = 1·2, which implies that ε, the
elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods (of the same origin), is 6. Parameter θ is set
equal to 0·75, a value consistent with an average period of one year between price adjustments.
We assume β = 0·99, which implies a riskless annual return of about 4% in the steady state.
We set a baseline value for α (or degree of openness) of 0·4. The latter corresponds roughly
to the import/GDP ratio in Canada, which we take as a prototype small open economy. In the
calibration of the interest rate rules we follow the original Taylor estimate and set φπ equal to
1·5, while ρ = (0·99)−1 − 1.
In order to calibrate the stochastic properties of the exogenous driving forces, we ﬁt AR(1)
processes to (log) labour productivity in Canada (our proxy for domestic productivity), and (log)
U.S. GDP (our proxy for world output), using quarterly, HP-ﬁltered data over the sample period
1963:1–2002:4. We obtain the following estimates (with standard errors in parantheses):
at = 0·66
(0·06)
at−1 + εa
t , σa = 0·0071
y∗
t = 0·86
(0·04)
y∗
t−1 + ε∗
t , σy∗ = 0·0078
with corr(εa
t ,ε∗
t ) = 0·3.
5.1.2. Impulse responses. We start by describing the dynamic effects of a domestic
productivity shock on a number of macroeconomic variables. Figure 1 displays the impulse724 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
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FIGURE 1
Impulse responses to a domestic productivity shock under alternative policy rules
responses to a unit innovation in at under the four regimes considered. By construction, domestic
inﬂation and the output gap remain unchanged under the optimal policy (DIT). We also see that
the shock leads to a persistent reduction in the domestic interest rate as it is needed in order
to support the transitory expansion in consumption and output consistent with the ﬂexible price
equilibrium allocation. Given the constancy of the world nominal interest rate, uncovered interest
parity implies an initial nominal depreciation followed by expectations of a future appreciation,
as reﬂected in the response of the nominal exchange rate. Relative to all other regimes, the
constancy of domestic prices accounts for a larger real depreciation and therefore for a further
expansion in demand and output through a rise in net exports (not shown here). Given constant
world prices and the stationarity of the terms of trade, the constancy of domestic prices implies
a mean-reverting response of the nominal exchange rate.
It is interesting to contrast the implied dynamic behaviour of the same variables under the
optimal policy to the one under the two stylized Taylor rules (DITR and CITR). Notice, at ﬁrst,
that both rules generate, unlike the optimal policy, a permanent fall in both domestic and CPIGAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 725
prices. The unit root in domestic prices is then mirrored, under both rules, by the unit root in the
nominal exchange rate.
A key difference between the two Taylor rules concerns the behaviour of the terms of trade.
While under DITR the terms of trade depreciate on impact and then start immediately to revert
to steady state (mirroring closely the response under the optimal policy), under CITR the initial
response of the terms of trade is more muted, and is followed by a hump-shaped pattern. The
intuition is simple. Under both rules, the rise in domestic productivity and the required real
depreciation lead, for given domestic prices, to an increase in CPI inﬂation. However, under
CITR the desired stabilization of CPI inﬂation is partly achieved, relative to DITR, by means of
a more muted response of the terms of trade (since the latter affect the CPI), and a fall in domestic
prices. The fall in prices, in turn, requires a negative output gap and hence a more contractionary
monetary policy (i.e. a higher interest rate). Under our calibration the latter takes the form of
an initial rise in both nominal and real interest rates, with the subsequent path of the real rate
remaining systematically above that implied by the optimal policy or a DITR policy.22
Finally, the same ﬁgure displays the corresponding impulse responses under a PEG. Notice
that the responses of output gap and inﬂation are qualitatively similar to the CITR case. However,
the impossibility of lowering the nominal rate and letting the currency depreciate, as would be
needed in order to support the expansion in consumption and output required in order to replicate
theﬂexiblepriceallocation,leadstoaverylimitedresponseinthetermsoftrade,andinturntoan
ampliﬁcation of the responses of domestic inﬂation and output gap. Interestingly, under a PEG,
the complete stabilization of the nominal exchange rate generates stationarity of the domestic
price level and, in turn, also of the CPI level (given the stationarity in the terms of trade). This is
a property that the PEG regime shares with the optimal policy as speciﬁed above. The stationarity
in the price level also explains why, in response to the shock, domestic inﬂation initially falls and
then rises persistently above the steady state.
As discussed below, the different dynamics of the terms of trade are unambiguously
associated with a welfare loss, relative to the optimal policy.23
5.1.3. Second moments and welfare losses. In order to complement our quantitative
analysis, Table 1 reports business cycle properties of several key variables under alternative
monetary policy regimes. The numbers conﬁrm some of the ﬁndings that were already evident
from visual inspection of the impulse responses. Thus we see that the critical element that
distinguishes each simple rule relative to the optimal policy is the excess smoothness of both
the terms of trade and the (ﬁrst differenced) nominal exchange rate.24 This in turn is reﬂected in
too high a volatility of the output gap and domestic inﬂation under the simple rules. In particular,
the PEG regime is the one that ampliﬁes both output gap and inﬂation volatility to the largest
extent, with the CITR regime lying somewhere in between. Furthermore, notice that the terms
of trade are more stable under an exchange rate peg than under any other policy regime. That
ﬁnding, which is consistent with the evidence of Mussa (1986), points to the existence of “excess
smoothness” in real exchange rates under ﬁxed exchange rates. That feature is a consequence of
22. The implied pattern for the nominal rate is still consistent with the observed depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate on impact. It is, in fact, the behaviour of current and expected future interest rate differentials that
matters for the current nominal exchange rate, as can be easily seen by solving the uncovered interest parity condition
forward.
23. We display our results on welfare later. Notice, however, that the cost of dampening exchange rate volatility
(and therefore the relative ranking between DITR and CITR) may be a function of the lags with which exchange rate
movements affect prices, i.e. of the degree of pass-through. Intuitively, the lower the degree of pass-through, the smaller
(ceteris paribus) the cost of short-run relative price inertia, and therefore the more desirable to pursue a policy of CITR
relative to DITR.
24. We report statistics for the nominal depreciation rate, as opposed to the level, given that both DITR and CITR
imply a unit root in the nominal exchange rate.726 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
TABLE 1
Cyclical properties of alternative policy regimes
Optimal DI Taylor CPI Taylor Peg
sd% sd% sd% sd%
Output 0·95 0·68 0·72 0·86
Domestic inﬂation 0·00 0·27 0·27 0·36
CPI inﬂation 0·38 0·41 0·27 0·21
Nominal inﬂ. rate 0·32 0·41 0·41 0·21
Terms of trade 1·60 1·53 1·43 1·17
Nominal depr. rate 0·95 0·86 0·53 0·00
Note: Sd denotes standard deviation in %.
TABLE 2
Contribution to welfare losses
DI Taylor CPI Taylor Peg
Benchmark µ = 1·2,ϕ = 3
Var(Domestic inﬂ.) 0·0157 0·0151 0·0268
Var(Output gap) 0·0009 0·0019 0·0053
Total 0·0166 0·0170 0·0321
Low steady state mark-up µ = 1·1,ϕ = 3
Var(Domestic inﬂ.) 0·0287 0·0277 0·0491
Var(Output gap) 0·0009 0·0019 0·0053
Total 0·0297 0·0296 0·0544
Low elasticity of labour supply µ = 1·2,ϕ = 10
Var(Domestic inﬂ.) 0·0235 0·0240 0·0565
Var(Output gap) 0·0005 0·0020 0·0064
Total 0·0240 0·0261 0·0630
Low mark-up and elasticity of labour supply µ = 1·1,ϕ = 10
Var(Domestic inﬂ.) 0·0431 0·0441 0·1036
Var(Output gap) 0·0005 0·0020 0·0064
Total 0·0436 0·0461 0·1101
Note: Entries are percentage units of steady state consumption.
theinabilityofprices(whicharesticky)tocompensatefortheconstancyofthenominalexchange
rate.25
Table 2 reports the welfare losses associated with the three simple rules analysed in the
previous section: DITR, CITR, and PEG. There are four panels in this table. The top panel
reports welfare losses in the case of our benchmark parameterization, while the remaining three
panels display the effects of lowering, respectively, the steady state mark-up, the elasticity of
labour supply and both. All entries are to be read as percentage units of steady state consumption,
and in deviation from the ﬁrst best represented by DIT. Under our baseline calibration all rules
are suboptimal since they involve non-trivial deviations from full domestic price stability. Also
one result stands out clearly: under all the calibrations considered an exchange rate peg implies
a substantially larger deviation from the ﬁrst best than DITR and CITR, as one may have
anticipated from the quantitative evaluation of the second moments conducted above. However,
and as is usually the case in welfare exercises of this sort found in the literature, the implied
welfare losses are quantitatively small for all policy regimes.
We consider next the effect of lowering, respectively, the steady state mark-up to 1·1, by
setting ε = 11 (which implies a larger penalization of inﬂation variability in the loss function)
25. See Monacelli (2004) for a detailed analysis of the implications of ﬁxed exchange rates.GAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 727
and the elasticity of labour supply to 0·1 (which implies a larger penalization of output gap
variability). This has a general effect of generating a substantial magniﬁcation of the welfare
losses relative to the benchmark case, especially in the third exercise where the two parameters
are lowered simultaneously. In the case of low mark-up and low elasticity of labour supply,
the PEG regime leads to non-trivial welfare losses relative to the optimum. Notice also that
under all scenarios considered here the two stylized Taylor rules, DITR and CITR, imply
very similar welfare losses. While this points to a substantial irrelevance in the speciﬁcation
of the inﬂation index in the monetary authority’s interest rate rule, the same result may once
again be sensitive to the assumption of complete exchange rate pass-through speciﬁed in our
context.26
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present paper has developed and analysed a tractable optimizing model of a small open
economy with staggered price setting ` a la Calvo. We have shown that the equilibrium dynamics
for that model economy have a canonical representation (in terms of domestic inﬂation and
the output gap) analogous to that of its closed economy counterpart. More precisely, their
representations differ only in two respects: (a) some coefﬁcients of the equilibrium dynamical
system for the small open economy depend on parameters that are speciﬁc to the latter (the
degree of openness, and the substitutability across goods produced in different countries), and
(b) the natural levels of output and interest rates in the small open economy are generally a
function of both domestic and foreign disturbances. In particular, the closed economy is nested
in the small open economy model, as a limiting case.
Under some special—but not implausible—assumptions (log utility and unit elasticity of
substitution between bundles of goods produced in different countries) we have shown how a
second order approximation to the utility of the small open economy’s consumer can be derived,
and the welfare level implied by alternative monetary policy rules can be evaluated. In that case,
the implied loss function is analogous to the one applying to the corresponding closed economy,
i.e. it penalizes ﬂuctuations in domestic inﬂation and the output gap. In particular, under our
assumptions, domestic inﬂation targeting emerges as the optimal policy regime.
We have then used our framework to analyse the properties of three alternative monetary
regimes for the small open economy: (a) a domestic inﬂation-based Taylor rule, (b) a CPI-based
Taylor rule, and (c) an exchange rate peg. Our analysis points to the presence of a trade-off
between the stabilization of both the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade, on the one
hand, and the stabilization of domestic inﬂation and the output gap on the other. Hence a policy of
domestic inﬂation targeting, which achieves a simultaneous stabilization of both domestic prices
and the output gap, entails a substantially larger volatility of the nominal exchange rate and the
terms of trade relative to the simple Taylor rules and/or an exchange rate peg. The converse is true
for the latter regime. In general, a CPI-based Taylor rule delivers equilibrium dynamics that lie
somewhere between a domestic inﬂation-based Taylor rule and a peg. Perhaps not surprisingly,
an exchange rate peg generates substantially higher welfare losses than a Taylor rule, due to the
excess smoothness of the terms of trade that it entails. In all our simulations, a Taylor rule in
which the monetary authority reacts to domestic inﬂation is shown to deliver higher welfare than
a similar rule based on the CPI index of inﬂation.
Our framework lends itself to several extensions. First, it is important to emphasize that,
in our analysis, domestic price stability (along with fully ﬂexible exchange rates) stands out
26. In the context of a different model, with both tradable and non-tradable goods and capital accumulation,
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001) point out that the welfare ranking between domestic and CPI targeting may be sensitive
to the speciﬁcation of other distortions in the economy, for instance, the adoption of a transaction role for money.728 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
as the welfare maximizing policy in the particular case of log utility and unitary elasticity of
substitution (both between domestic and foreign goods in general and between different foreign
countries’ goods), coupled with an appropriate subsidy scheme that guarantees the optimality
(from the viewpoint of the small open economy) of the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation. The
derivationoftherelevantwelfarefunctionforthesmallopeneconomyinthecaseofmoregeneral
preferences as well as that of uncorrected steady state distortions would allow a more thorough
analysis and quantitative evaluation of the optimal monetary policy and should certainly be the
object of future research.27
Second, a two-country version of the framework developed here would allow us to analyse
a number of issues that cannot be addressed with the present model, including the importance of
spillover effects in the design of optimal monetary policy, the potential beneﬁts from monetary
policy coordination, and the implications of exchange rate stabilization agreements. Recent work
by Clarida et al. (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Pappa (2004) has already made some
inroads on that front.
A further interesting extension would involve the introduction, along with sticky prices,
of sticky nominal wages in the small open economy. As pointed out by Erceg, Henderson and
Levine (2000), the simultaneous presence of the two forms of nominal rigidity introduces an
additional trade-off that renders strict price inﬂation targeting policies suboptimal. It may be
interesting to analyse how that trade-off would affect the ranking across monetary policy regimes
obtained in the present paper.
Finally, it is worth noticing that our analysis features complete exchange rate pass-through
of nominal exchange rate changes to prices of imported (or exported) goods. Some of the
implications of less than complete pass-through associated with local currency pricing by
exporters and importers have already been analysed by several authors in the context of two-
country models with one-period advanced price-setting (see, e.g. Devereux and Engel (2002),
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)). It would be interesting to
explore some of those implications (e.g. for the nature of the optimal monetary policy problem
and the relative performance of alternative policy regimes) in the context of the simple small
open economy with staggered price-setting proposed here.
APPENDIX A. THE PERFECT FORESIGHT STEADY STATE
In order to show how the home economy’s terms of trade are uniquely pinned down in the perfect foresight steady state,
we invoke symmetry among all countries (other than the home country), and then show how the terms of trade and output
in the home economy are determined. Without loss of generality, we assume a unit value for productivity in all foreign
countries, and a productivity level A in the home economy. We show that in the symmetric case (when A = 1) the
terms of trade for the home economy must necessarily be equal to unity in the steady state, whereas output in the home
economy coincides with that in the rest of the world.
First, notice that the goods market clearing condition, when evaluated at the steady state, implies
Y = (1 − α)

PH
P
−η
C + α
Z 1
0
 
PH
Ei Pi
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!−γ  
Pi
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Pi
!−η
Cidi
=

PH
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−η
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Z 1
0
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!γ−η
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η
i Cidi

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= h(S)ηC
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Z 1
0

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γ−η
Q
η− 1
σ
i di
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(1 − α) + αSγ−ηq(S)η− 1
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
27. See Benigno and Woodford (2004) for recent developments in this direction.GAL´ I & MONACELLI SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 729
where we have made use of (17) and of the relationship
P
PH
=
"
(1 − α) + α
Z 1
0
(Si)1−η di
# 1
1−η
=
h
(1 − α) + α (S)1−η
i 1
1−η ≡ h(S)
and we have made the substitution Q = S
h(S) ≡ q(S). Notice that q(S) is strictly increasing in S.
Under the assumptions above, the international risk sharing condition implies that the relationship
C = C∗ Q
1
σ
= C∗ q(S)
1
σ
must also hold in the steady state.
Hence, combining the two relations above, and imposing the world market clearing condition C∗ = Y∗ we obtain
Y =

(1 − α) h(S)η q(S)
1
σ + α Sγ−ηh(S)ηq(S)η

Y∗
=

(1 − α) h(S)η q(S)
1
σ + α h(S)γq(S)γ

Y∗ (A.1)
≡ v(S) Y∗ (A.2)
where v(S) > 0, v0(S) > 0, and v(1) = 1.
Furthermore, the clearing of the labour market in the steady state implies
Cσ

Y
A
ϕ
=
W
P
= A
1 − 1
ε
(1 − τ)
PH
P
= A
1 − 1
ε
(1 − τ)
1
h(S)
which, when combined with the sharing condition above, yields
Y = A
1+ϕ
ϕ
 
1 − 1
ε
(1 − τ) (Y∗)σ S
! 1
ϕ
. (A.3)
Notice that, conditional on A and Y∗, (A.2) and (A.3) constitute a system of two equations in Y and S, with a
unique solution, given by
Y = Y∗ = A
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
 
1 − 1
ε
1 − τ
! 1
σ+ϕ
and
S = 1
which in turn must imply Si = 1 for all i.
APPENDIX B. OPTIMAL PRICE-SETTING IN THE CALVO MODEL
Following Calvo (1983) we assume that each individual ﬁrm resets its price with probability 1 − θ each period,
independently of the time elapsed since its last price adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1 − θ of (randomly
selected) ﬁrms reset their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged. Let PH,t(j) denote the price set by a
ﬁrm j adjusting its price in period t. Under the Calvo price-setting structure, PH,t+k(j) = PH,t(j) with probability θk
for k = 0,1,2,.... Since all ﬁrms resetting prices in any given period will choose the same price, we henceforth drop
the j subscript.730 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
When setting a new price in period t ﬁrm j seeks to maximize the current value of its dividend stream, conditional
on that price being effective:
maxPH,t
X∞
k=0 θk Et
n
Qt,t+k [Yt+k (PH,t − MCn
t+k)]
o
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
Yt+k(j) ≤
 
PH,t
PH,t+k
!−ε  
CH,t+k +
Z 1
0
Ci
H,t+kdi
!
≡ Yd
t+k(PH,t)
where MCn
t = (1−τ)Wt
At denotes the nominal marginal cost.
Thus, PH,t must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition
X∞
k=0 θk Et

Qt,t+k Yt+k

PH,t −
ε
ε − 1
MCn
t+k

= 0. (B.1)
Using the fact that Qt,t+k = βk (Ct+k/Ct)−σ(Pt/Pt+k), we can rewrite the previous condition as
X∞
k=0(βθ)k Et

P−1
t+k C−σ
t+k Yt+k

PH,t −
ε
ε − 1
MCn
t+k

= 0
or, in terms of stationary variables,
X∞
k=0(βθ)k Et
(
C−σ
t+k Yt+k
PH,t−1
Pt+k
 
PH,t
PH,t−1
−
ε
ε − 1
5H
t−1,t+k MCt+k
!)
= 0
where 5H
t−1,t+k ≡
PH,t+k
PH,t−1 , and MCt+k =
MCn
t+k
PH,t+k . Log-linearizing the previous condition around the zero-inﬂation
steady state with balanced trade we obtain
pH,t = pH,t−1 +
X∞
k=0 (βθ)k Et{πH,t+k} + (1 − βθ)
X∞
k=0 (βθ)k Et{c mct+k}
where c mct ≡ mct − mc is the (log) deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state value mc = −log ε
ε−1 ≡ −µ.
Notice, that we can rewrite the previous expression in more compact form as
pH,t − pH,t−1 = βθ Et{pH,t+1 − pH,t} + πH,t + (1 − βθ) c mct. (B.2)
Alternatively, using the relationship c mct = mcn
t − pH,t + µ to substitute for c mct in (B.2), and after some
straightforward algebra, we obtain a version of the price-setting rule in terms of expected nominal marginal costs:
pH,t = µ + (1 − βθ)
X∞
k=0 (βθ)k Et{mcn
t+k}
which corresponds to expression (23) in the text.
Under the assumed price-setting structure, the dynamics of the domestic price index are described by the equation
PH,t ≡
h
θ PH,t−1
1−ε + (1 − θ) (PH,t)1−ε
i 1
1−ε (B.3)
which can be log-linearized around the zero-inﬂation steady state to yield
πH,t = (1 − θ) (pH,t − pH,t−1).
Finally, we can combine the previous expression with (B.2) above to yield, after some algebra,
πH,t = β Et{πH,t+1} + λ c mct
where λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ , and which corresponds to (32) in the text.
APPENDIX C. OPTIMAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
After setting rt = rrt and plugging into (37), the equilibrium conditions can be summarized by means of the difference
equation

xt
πt

= AO

Et{xt+1}
Et{πt+1}

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where
AO ≡

1 σ−1
κ β + κσ−1

.
Clearly, xt = πt = 0, all t, constitutes a solution to (C.1). Yet, as shown in Blanchard and Khan (1980), a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition for the uniqueness of such a solution in a system with no predetermined variables like (C.1) is
that the two eigenvalues of AO lie inside the unique circle. It is easy to check, however, that such a condition is not
satisﬁed in our case. More precisely, while both eigenvalues of AO can be shown to be real and positive, the largest is
always greater than one. As a result there exists a continuum of solutions in a neighbourhood of (0,0) that satisfy the
equilibrium conditions (local indeterminacy) and one cannot rule out the possibility of equilibria displaying ﬂuctuations
driven by self-fulﬁlling revisions in expectations (stationary sunspot ﬂuctuations).
That indeterminacy problem can be avoided, and the uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation restored, by having
the central bank follow a rule which would imply that the interest rate should respond to inﬂation and/or the output gap
were those variables to deviate from their (zero) target values. More precisely, suppose that the central bank commits
itself to following the rule
rt = rrt + φπ πt + φx xt. (C.2)
In that case, the equilibrium is described by a stochastic difference equation like (C.1), with
AT ≡ 

σ 1 − βφπ
σκ κ + β(σ + φx)

where  ≡ 1
σ+φx+κφπ . If we restrict ourselves to non-negative values of φπ and φx, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for AT to have both eigenvalues inside the unit circle (thus implying that (0,0) is the unique non-explosive solution to
(C.1)) is given by28
κ (φπ − 1) + (1 − β) φx > 0. (C.3)
Notice that, once uniqueness is restored, the term φπ πt + φx xt appended to the interest rate rule vanishes,
implying that rt = rrt all t. Intuitively, stabilization of the output gap and inﬂation requires a credible threat by the
central bank to vary the interest rate sufﬁciently in response to any deviations of inﬂation and/or the output gap from
target; yet the very existence of that threat makes its effective application unnecessary.
APPENDIX D. DERIVATION OF THE WELFARE LOSS FUNCTION IN A SPECIAL CASE
In the present Appendix we derive a second order approximation of representative consumer’s utility about the ﬂexible
price equilibrium allocation. As discussed in the main text, we eventually restrict our analysis to the special case of
σ = η = γ = 1. Below we make frequent use of the following second order approximation of per cent deviations in
terms of log deviations:
Yt − Y
Y
= yt +
1
2
y2
t + o(kak3)
where o(kakn) represents terms that are of order higher than n-th, in the bound kak on the amplitude of the relevant
shocks.
Notice that we can write the utility of consumption as
logCt = ct +e ct
= ct + (1 − α) xt
where in deriving the second equality we have made use of the fact that, under our assumptions, the exact relationships
(18) and (29) can be combined to yield ct = (1 − α)yt + αy∗
t .
We can also approximate the disutility of labour about its level in the ﬂexible price equilibrium, i.e.
N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
=
N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
+ N
1+ϕ
t

e nt +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)e n2
t

+ o(kak3).
The next step consists in rewriting the previous expression in terms of the output gap. Using the fact that
Nt =

Yt
At
R 1
0
 PH,t(i)
PH,t
−ε
di, we have
e nt = xt + zt
28. See, e.g. Bullard and Mitra (2002).732 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
where zt ≡ log
R 1
0
 PH,t(i)
PH,t
−ε
di. The following lemma shows that zt is proportional to the cross-sectional distribution
of relative prices (and, hence, of second order).
Lemma 1. zt = ε
2vari{pH,t(i)} + o(kak3).
Proof. Let b pH,t(i) ≡ pH,t(i) − pH,t. Notice that

PH,t(i)
PH,t
1−ε
= exp

(1 − ε) b pH,t(i)

= 1 + (1 − ε) b pH,t(i) +
(1 − ε)2
2
b pH,t(i)2 + o(kak3).
Furthermore, from the deﬁnition of PH,t, we have 1 =
R 1
0
 PH,t(i)
PH,t
1−ε
di. Hence, it follows that
Ei{b pH,t(i)} =
(ε − 1)
2
Ei{b pH,t(i)2}.
In addition, a second order approximation to
 PH,t(i)
PH,t
−ε
, yields

PH,t(i)
PH,t
−ε
= 1 − ε b pH,t(i) +
ε2
2
b pH,t(i)2 + o(kak3).
Combining the two previous results, it follows that
Z 1
0

PH,t(i)
PH,t
−ε
di = 1 +
ε
2
Ei{b pH,t(i)2}
= 1 +
ε
2
vari{pH,t(i)}
from which it follows that zt = ε
2 vari{pH,t(i)} + o(kak3).
We can thus rewrite the second order approximation to the disutility of labour as
N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
=
N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
+ N
1+ϕ
t

xt + zt +
1
2
(1 + ϕ) x2
t

+ o(kak3).
Under the optimal subsidy scheme assumed, the optimality condition N
1+ϕ
t = (1−α) holds for all t, allowing us
to rewrite the period utility as
U(Ct, Nt) = −(1 − α)

zt +
1
2
(1 + ϕ) x2
t

+ t.i.p. + o(kak3)
where t.i.p. denotes terms independent of policy.
Lemma 2.
P∞
t=0 βt vari{pH,t(i)} = 1
λ
P∞
t=0 βt π2
H,t, where λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ .
Proof. Woodford (2003, Chapter 6).
Collecting the previous results, we can write the second order approximation to the small open economy’s
consumer’s utility function as follows:
W ≡ −
(1 − α)
2
X∞
t=0 βt
hε
λ
π2
H,t + (1 + ϕ) x2
t
i
+ t.i.p. + o(kak3)
which is equation (40) in the text.
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